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The repositioning of the large emerging economies in the world economy
The authors of this article are Carmen Carrasco, Luis Molina and Luis Orgaz, of the Associate Directorate General 
International Affairs.1
Over the past decade the emerging economies have grown much faster than the developed 
economies and, as a result, their share of world GDP and their relative weight in most eco-
nomic, trade and fi nancial variables have increased substantially. The most recent projections 
suggest this trend will continue in the coming years. The economic and fi nancial crisis –which 
hit the advanced economies hardest, while the emerging economies showed notable resil-
ience to its effects– has accelerated the rise in importance of the emerging economies. More-
over, the crisis has brought signifi cant changes in world economic governance, most notably 
the replacement of the G7 by the G20 as the forum providing international leadership in eco-
nomic matters. The accompanying map depicts the main groups of countries mentioned in 
this article.
These developments have given rise to new actors of crucial importance on the global stage 
(most notably China) and have consolidated the status of the group of large emerging econo-
mies formed by India, Brazil and Russia, in addition to China –the so-called BRICs [O´Neil 
(2001)]– which recently has even taken steps along the path to institutionalisation. The coun-
tries of this group have an increasing weight in the world economy and, in general, high growth 
potential, although they also exhibit signifi cant productive, trade, fi nancial and institutional dif-
ferences.
Overall, these events can be interpreted as signs that the world is moving towards a more 
multipolar international economic order in which the emerging countries will have –and in fact 
the BRICs already have– an ever larger and more important role.
This article seeks to put into perspective and calibrate the growing share of the emerging 
economies, particularly the BRICs, in the world economy. It also examines the changes in 
these economies’ participation in the main fora and key institutions of world economic govern-
ment and whether their greater presence in these fora has been accompanied by the assump-
tion of greater responsibility. For this purpose, following is a brief description of the position 
adopted by these countries on certain key subjects in the global sphere, such as the stability 
of the international monetary system, international trade and climate change.
Historically the emerging economies,2 which account for most of the world population, have 
shown similar, albeit notably more volatile, economic growth rates to those of the advanced 
countries, a factor which limited real convergence between these two areas. However, the turn 
of the century saw a radical change in this situation. In the past decade the emerging econo-
mies have consistently posted higher growth rates, while their population growth rates have 
decreased. They have therefore recorded substantial rises in GDP per capita. This headway 
has come against a background in which the emerging economies are more fully integrated in 
Introduction
The growing weight of the 
emerging economies in 
the world economy
1. For greater detail, see El reposicionamiento de las grandes economías emergentes en la economía mundial: los BRIC, 
Documentos Ocasionales, Banco de España, forthcoming.  2. This article adopts the IMF World Economic Outlook’s 
current defi nitions of advanced, emerging and developing economies, which may not coincide with those of the World 
Bank or with those of the IMF itself for other types of analysis (such as the calculation of quotas and voting power by 
group of countries), or with what has traditionally been understood as such. Thus the advanced economies include the 
Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Israel, South Korea, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia and Taiwan.
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the world economy and have become simultaneously both the main benefi ciaries and the driv-
ing force of globalisation. This integration has occurred in the areas of both trade and fi nance. 
Furthermore, in recent years the favourable growth outlook of the emerging economies, their 
growing share of the global economy and their improved macroeconomic fundamentals have 
signifi cantly lowered the perception of risk associated with them.
As pointed out above, the emerging and developing economies (hereafter referred to simply 
as the “emerging economies”) account for most of the world population. Furthermore, their 
population growth rates are far higher than those of the advanced countries, even taking into 
account the growing migration to the latter (see Table 1). In 1960, 76.7% of the world popula-
tion lived in these areas, and on IMF estimates this percentage will be 85.4% by 2015. How-
ever, the population growth rate of the four BRIC countries has been below the world rate 
since 2000, basically due to China, and, as a result, the share of the BRICs in the world popu-
lation has stabilised at around 44%.
Also, since the new century began the difference between the growth rates of the emerging and 
the more developed countries has widened. In the last two decades of the previous century, the 
average GDP growth rate was 2.9% in the advanced economies and 3.6% in the emerging 
economies, while in the past decade the averages have been 1.9% and 6.2%, respectively, and 
this difference will persist between 2011 and 2015 (6.6% in the emerging economies and 2.5% 
in the advanced economies) according to IMF long-term forecasts. In the emerging economies, 
COUNTRY GROUPINGS (a)  MAP 1 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
 
a. The groupings shown here are for the purposes of the article, since some advanced countries have been invited to the meetings of the 
G20 on several occasions, while Spain in particular has "permanent guest" status at those meetings. The ten emerging countries of the G20 
are Brazil, Russia, India, China, Mexico, Argentina, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa  and Saudi Arabia. Also forming part of the G20 are the 
G7 countries, namely the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, as well as Australia and South 
Korea, all advanced countries according to the classi?cation of the IMF World Economic Outlook. The twentieth member is the European 
Union. 
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the BRICs are among the countries which have grown most. The GDP of this group expanded 
by an average of 7.9% between 2000 and 2010, and is expected to grow at 8.1% between 
2011 and 2015 (see Chart 1). This acceleration is due to a jump in the growth rates of Brazil 
(from 2.3% in 1980-1999 to 3.7% in 2000-2010 and to an estimated 4.1% until 2015) and, es-
pecially, of India (5.5%, 7.1% and 8.2% in the stated periods). To this must be added the growth 
of China, which has averaged 10% since the 1980s. The high investment rates of the group 
point, moreover, to potentially even higher growth in the future (see Chart 1). The strong growth 
of the last ten years has substantially raised the emerging economies’ share of world GDP. Thus, 
expressing GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, which tends to increase the weight of 
these economies, given their lower price level, it can be seen that in 1980 66.6% of GDP origi-
nated in the advanced countries, while this percentage decreased sharply to 53% in 2010 and 
will foreseeably drop below 50% by 2015. Within the emerging economies, the BRICs are again 
those whose share has increased most, rising from 12.2% of world GDP in 1980 to 24.5% in 
2010, and this percentage which may reach 29.1% in 2015. 
Hence the emerging economies have become the engines of world growth: Chart 1 shows 
that in the 1980s and 1990s the advanced economies accounted for more than half of world 
growth –1.9 percentage points (pp) against 1.2 pp for the emerging economies– while from 
2000 to 2010 the opposite occurred, with the emerging economies accounting for 2.6 pp and 
the advanced economies barely 1.1 pp. It is expected that in the period 2011 to 2015 the 
emerging countries’ share will increase even more (3.3 pp), so the projected higher growth of 
the global economy in the next fi ve years is attributable solely to the higher contribution of the 
emerging economies. The BRICs, which contributed 1.6 pp to world growth in 2000-2010, will 
contribute 2.2 pp in 2011-2015. 
The behaviour of the emerging economies’ activity and population since 2000 has given rise 
to an increasing growth rate of GDP per capita, above that of the advanced economies, 
Population (million) GDP PPP ($bn) GDP growth (%) (b) GDP per capita ($)
1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2010 1990 2009
BRICs 38.4 2,297 2,867 3,611 16,788 4,8 8,0 5,873 6,851
Brazil 8.6 147 191 782 2,010 1,9 3,7 7,179 9,455
Russia 17.1 145 141 1,169 2,116 -2,1 4,9 12,630 13,554
India 3.3 862 1,199 750 3,615 5,6 7,4 1,249 2,970
China 9.6 1,143 1,335 910 9,047 9,8 10,5 1,101 6,200
Other emerging countries 60.9 1,993 2,793 5,332 15,861 3,3 4,5 7,709 10,304
Emerging countries (a) 99.3 4,290 5,660 8,943 32,649 3,9 6,2 6,941 8,542
Advanced countries (a) 30.5 891 1,011 16,437 37,391 2,9 1,6 27,230 35,183
World 129.9 5,182 6,671 25,380 70,040 3,2 3,6 20,081 22,764
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
BRIC / Emerging (%) 38.7 53.5 51 41.6 52.0 1.9 3.9 84.6 80.2
BRIC / World (%) 29.6 44.3 43 13.9 24.5 0.8 1.6 29.2 30.1
Emerging / World (%) 76.4 82.8 85 33.4 47.1 1.4 2.6 34.6 37.5
Area 
(million 
km2)
WEIGHT OF BRICs AND EMERGING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY TABLE 1
SOURCES: WEO, IMF and World Bank. 
 
a. Classi?cation of advanced, emerging and developing countries used by the IMF in the WEO. The whole of this table is consistent with that 
classi?cation, which differs from that used o??cially by the World Bank and the IMF when these institutions calculate vote reallocations by 
country group. 
b. Average of the periods 1990-2000 and 2001-2010. Memorandum items are contributions (in percentage points) to emerging country 
growth and to world growth. 
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which has brought real convergence. This convergence has been much more marked in the 
BRICs. In terms of the human development index (a more comprehensive measure of wel-
fare than per capita income), the emerging countries have also improved. And in the last 15 
years the BRIC group has been moving much faster towards the levels of the advanced 
economies (see Chart 1).
A less benign aspect of this process of development is the rapid increase in greenhouse gas 
emissions, with its negative consequences for climate and ecological balance on a worldwide 
scale. Nowadays two thirds of emissions are by non-member countries of the OECD (see Ta-
ble 2). The BRICs currently account for one third of world greenhouse gas emissions originat-
ing from fuel combustion, such as CO2. Their share increased by seven percentage points (pp) 
between 1990 and 2007, from 25% to 32%. In that year China for the fi rst time exceeded the 
United States as the world’s largest emitter of CO2, accounting for 21% of the world total; 
Russia, for its part, is the only BRIC whose CO2 emissions decreased in that period, dropping 
by 27% as a result of the country’s economic decline in the 1990s, despite which it continues 
to rank third worldwide among the CO2 emitting countries. The fourth highest emitter is India, 
whose emissions have doubled between 1990 and 2007, with Brazil being ranked lower. The 
International Energy Agency [IEA (2009)] estimates that, without the adoption of new meas-
ures, the BRICs’ share of world emissions will continue to increase and by 2030 will exceed 
42%, compared with 25% for the United States, the EU and Japan together.
The change in growth trends took place against a background of rapid integration in the global 
commodity and capital markets. The emerging economies raised their openness to trade on a 
sustained basis. Exports rose from 19.4% of GDP in 1980 to 29.9% in 2009, and imports from 
21.2% to 27.8%, which meant that their openness to trade went from 40.6% of GDP in 1980 to 
57.7% 2010, overtaking that of the advanced economies (36.7% in 1980 and 50.8% in 2009). 
Again, the BRIC group, led by the two Asian countries, underwent the most pronounced changes, 
with its trade openness rising from 20.5% in 1980 to 47% in 2009. As a result, the emerging 
economies play an increasing role in world trade (see Chart 2); in particular, China became the third 
largest world exporter in 2009. The increase in the trade openness of the developing economies 
IEA benchmark 
scenario (a)
IEA 450 
scenario (b)
1990 2007
China 11 21 29 27
India 3 5 8 8
Russia 10 5 5 5
Brazil 1 1 nd nd
BRICs 25 32 42 40
United States 23 20 14 12
EU27 19 14 9 9
Japan 5 4 2 2
UNITED STATES + EU27 + JAPAN 47 38 25 23
REST OF THE WORLD 28 30 33 37
World total (Gt) 20,9 28,8 40,2 26,4
2030
CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION (% and Gt.)  TABLE 2 
SOURCE: International Energy Agency. 
 
a. Without adoption of new mitigation measures or policies additional to those adopted or announced in mid-2009. 
b. With adoption of new measures, including the adoption of cap-and-trade by the major emitters. 
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largely refl ects greater trade between the emerging regions themselves, which, as shown by Chart 
2, rose from 25.1% of the external trade of the emerging economies in 1990 to 37.6% in 2009. 
This trade basically centres on commodities, and the BRIC countries are especially active, either 
as exporters (Brazil and Russia) or as importers (China and India). However, China (in manufactur-
ing) and India (in services) are rapidly raising the technological content of their exports.
As with their trade integration, the fi nancial integration of the emerging economies has acceler-
ated substantially in recent years, although at a lower pace than in the advanced economies. 
Chart 3 shows that net private capital fl ows to these economies have been very high from 
1991 and have intensifi ed since 2000. As a result of all this, the sum of assets and liabilities as 
a percentage of GDP in the emerging economies rose from 66.9% to 114.5% between 1990 
and 2009, while these percentages were 144.4% and 455.6%, respectively, for the advanced 
economies. The largest increases were in eastern Europe and in the BRICs (particularly in Rus-
sia), whose fi nancial openness surged from 32% to 101.4%.
Direct investment played a notable role. Thus, while in 1990 direct investment fl ows moved 
between the advanced economies (99% of outfl ows and 87% of infl ows of this type of capital), 
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the current century has seen this picture change radically. Thus in 2009 the developing econ-
omies received 38.2% of total direct investment infl ows, i.e. an increase of 25 pp in their share. 
Likewise, the emerging economies saw their share of direct foreign investment outfl ows rise to 
15% of the total in 2009. Nearly half of the emerging economies’ direct investment infl ows and 
outfl ows are accounted for by the BRICs (see Chart 3), most notably China, which is the sec-
ond recipient of direct investment and is rapidly scaling positions amongst outward investors.
Portfolio fl ows have behaved similarly, with Brazil standing out amongst the recipients, 
while the emerging economies’ share of world fi xed income issues has increased less 
markedly (from 2.3% of total issues in 1990 to 10.3% in 2010). Brazil, with 1.8% of world 
issues, is the largest emerging economy issuer, followed by Russia, with 1.5% of the total. 
Much more marked is the role of the emerging economies in the accumulation of foreign 
reserves, since they have gone from holding 21% of international reserves in 1990 to a 
share of 66.7% at present. China, with $2.6 trillion, accounts for 30% of total world re-
serves, and the other three BRIC countries also hold large amounts, accounting for an-
other 11.5% of the world total. This accumulation, as will be seen below, entails risks for 
international fi nancial stability.
Overall, the emerging economies’ good outlook for short- and medium-term growth, their role 
in international trade and fi nancial fl ows and their progress in macroeconomic management 
and stability have reduced the perception of risk traditionally associated with them, particu-
larly the BRICs. Thus their sovereign debt rating has amply exceeded the investment rating 
level since 2005 (see Chart 3). This poses new challenges and responsibilities for these econ-
omies, in terms of contributing actively and positively to economic and fi nancial stability and to 
global governance.
The growing economic, trade and fi nancial weight of the emerging economies has made it 
inevitable and necessary for the institutions leading world economic governance to refl ect that 
new reality. The outbreak of the international fi nancial crisis precipitated that process, fi rst with 
the launch of the G20 as the key crisis management group at the Washington Summit (No-
vember 2008), and its subsequent self-proclamation as the principal forum for international 
economic cooperation (at the Pittsburgh Summit in November 2009), and second with the 
renovation drive of the IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore, the BRIC group of countries has 
taken steps towards a more institutionalisation nature by holding two summits at the level of 
heads of state and of government in Ekaterimburg in June 2009 and in Brasilia in June 2010, 
with another scheduled in China in 2011.
The four BRIC countries share a series of characteristics and interests that lend the group a 
certain coherence and explain the formation of this coalition, which can be described as “soft”. 
All of them are, to a greater or lesser extent, countries below average world per capita income 
(see Table 1), highly populated, economically large, of growing weight in the world economy 
and high potential. They are, in addition, systemically important countries [Truman (2006)] with 
the intent and ability to exercise signifi cant infl uence in world economic governance. Further-
more, their public sectors still predominate in many productive and fi nancial activities and they 
occupy a relatively low position in terms of institutional robustness and development. But the 
BRIC countries also exhibit very important differences in their production structure, their export 
specialisation, the size and sign of their current account balances and their foreign exchange 
regime, to mention just a few examples.
China’s largest size gives it a leadership role in the group, although in the global context vis-à-
vis the G7 countries, the dilution of China’s predominance in a group of nominally equal devel-
Participation of the large 
emerging economies in 
the international economic 
institutions
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oping countries with only loose common commitments is advisable, both for China and for the 
other BRICs. Thus, in matters in which there are diverging, or simply non-coincident, interests 
among the BRICs, the structure of a soft coalition enables its members to opt out, avoiding the 
costs of a stricter alliance, and even to enlist other emerging countries in a common position 
when feasible. It should be kept in mind that there are other emerging countries with charac-
teristics akin to those of the BRIC countries, such as Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia and even 
Turkey, all members of the G20. In this respect, the BRIC group could be termed a coalition of 
variable geometry.
The most visible sign of the growing infl uence of the BRICs and other emerging economies in 
world economic governance has been the replacement of the G7 by the G20 as the central 
forum for international economic cooperation. The reasons for this decision and the rapidness 
with which it was accepted and became operative are several. The fi rst was its timeliness and 
had to do with the state of emergency following the outbreak of the crisis and the need for a 
rapid and forceful response. Thus, what in a more normal situation would have been inter-
preted as the relinquishment of international leadership by the G-7 countries was regarded as 
a timely and necessary movement by them.
Another reason is that, in comparison with the G7, the G20 is much more representative be-
cause its 19 member countries account for 75% of world GDP in PPP terms and 62% of the 
world population, although it has also been accused of a lack of legitimacy because it omits 
many countries and has no predefi ned objective criteria for determining membership. In this 
respect, the prior existence of the G20 as a group already in place circumvented this issue and 
facilitated its choice as the new decision-making forum.
A new stage in the history of the G20 began in 2008, when it held its fi rst meeting attended by 
heads of state and of government, rather than by ministers of economy and central bank gov-
ernors, as had been the case since it was created in 1999. The new reinforced G20 decided 
to set up a Financial Stability Board (FSB), of which the 10 emerging countries of the G20, plus 
Korea, Spain and the EU, became members. This, along with the inclusion in the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision of the G20 emerging countries which previously had not formed 
part of it,3 notably expanded the number of countries participating directly in the international 
fora responsible for international fi nancial regulation.
In these fora each member country has the right to be heard and decisions are adopted by 
consensus, so each country is on an equal footing, which is of particular interest to the emerg-
ing countries. This avoids the problem of determining different countries’ weights, which com-
plicates the functioning of the more regimented institutions such as the IMF. Indeed, from the 
standpoint of the composition of the group, the G20 has a membership structure character-
ised by virtual parity: in addition to the EU, there are nine developed countries and 10 emerg-
ing countries (see map at the beginning of the article).
Lastly, another reason for the G7 giving way to the G20 is the expectation of greater ef-
fectiveness. Although it has been argued that the larger size of the G20 may impede con-
sensus, it is also true that consensus would be largely ineffective if it did not encompass 
systemic economies such as the BRICs and other emerging countries, which have to be 
taken into account in the coordination of national economic policies, due to their effects on 
other countries. The general acceptance of the G20 signifi es, in short, the acknowledge-
The G20
3. Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. Other new members of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision are Singapore and Hong Kong.
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ment by the developed countries that the exit from the crisis and the resolution of the 
problems besetting the world economy in recent years necessarily require greater interna-
tional coordination and more active involvement of the emerging countries. In exchange, it 
is to be expected that these will assume greater responsibility in the area of international 
coordination and will take into consideration the global effects of their national economic 
policies.
The desire to increase their voting power, right to be heard and representation in the IMF and 
the World Bank is one of the most solid common positions of the emerging countries and the 
BRICs. The latter group in particular assert that their voting power should refl ect their growing 
weight in world GDP and propose that the formulas for calculating quotas in the multilateral 
institutions give more weight to this variable, measured in PPP terms, and less to others rep-
resenting their weight in fi nancial fl ows.4 Table 3 shows that the latest revisions of voting pow-
er in the IMF and the World Bank put the BRICs at percentages of 13.5% and 12.3%, respec-
tively, which are below their weight in world GDP. This is explained basically by the situation of 
China and, to a much lesser extent, Brazil. However, in both the IMF and the World Bank, the 
emerging and developing countries as a whole have an aggregate voting power above their 
weight in world GDP in current terms.
The revisions of voting power in the IMF and World Bank to adapt their structure to changes 
in the economic and fi nancial weight of countries are enormously complex processes in which 
the gains of some countries inevitably mean losses for others. In any event, the reallocations 
of votes in the World Bank in recent years have raised the weight of the emerging and develop-
ing countries (up by 4 pp) and of the BRICs (up by 2 pp). In the IMF, the quotas and voting 
rights of the dynamic emerging economies and of developing countries will substantially in-
crease following the resolution of the G20 passed in Korea last October. This resolution, which 
will come into force by end-2012 following the ratifi cation process, in unison with the change 
agreed in April 2008, will raise the voting power of the four BRICs by 3.8 pp (2.4 pp of which 
correspond to China), putting all of them amongst the top 10 countries of the IMF in terms of 
voting power.
There are other aspects of the governance of the IMF and of the World Bank criticised by the 
emerging countries which are important in the decision-making process [IMF (2009)]. First, the 
emerging countries consider that the developed countries, particularly European ones, are 
overrepresented on the IMF board. By way of responding to their claim, in Korea the devel-
oped European countries undertook to reduce their representation on the board and raise that 
of the emerging and developing countries. However, it is hard to improve the situation of the 
BRICs, since China and Russia have their own seat (as does Saudi Arabia) and thus a perma-
nent representative, while Brazil and India, although they share a seat with other countries, 
always hold the position of executive director.
There are two other issues in the governance of Bretton Woods institutions which have at-
tracted criticism: the voting power of the United States and the selection of the persons head-
ing them. The fi rst is that certain matters, defi ned in the articles of association as very impor-
tant, require a qualifi ed majority of 85% of the total votes, and the United States is the only 
country with a percentage of votes above 15%. The amendment of this rule is precisely one of 
the matters which requires a qualifi ed majority to be changed. The second issue relates to the 
tradition that the managing director of the IMF is a European and the president of the World 
The IMF, the World Bank 
and other agents of 
international cooperation
4. The formulas include GDP in current terms and in PPP terms, as well as other economic and fi nancial variables as-
sociated with the specifi c functions of each institution.
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Bank is from the United States, although the articles of association only stipulate that the re-
spective boards have to elect the persons in these posts by simple majority.
The growing importance of the emerging countries is being refl ected to differing degrees in 
other areas of international cooperation, such as the multilateral regional development banks 
(MDBs), the Paris Club or the OECD. Regarding the former, the BRICs have a scant presence 
in the capital of the MDBs outside their region, although China has recently entered the Inter-
American Development Bank and the structure is highly consolidated, so there are notable 
restrictions on a substantially higher presence. The Paris Club, the group of creditor countries 
which renegotiate the bilateral offi cial debt of countries in payment diffi culties, only has Russia 
as a permanent member (Brazil is an associate member), although steps are being taken to 
increase the involvement of the other BRICs and of other emerging country creditors in this 
forum. Finally, membership of the OECD, traditionally a club of advanced countries, requires 
compliance with democratic and market economy principles, a condition which limits access 
by many emerging countries, regardless of their advances in economic development. Never-
theless, Russia is a candidate country, and progress is being made on a strategy of strength-
ened commitment and greater cooperation with various emerging economies, including the 
other BRICs.
The shared interests of the major emerging economies can be roughly determined from the 
common positions set out in the communiques published following the BRIC summits. With 
regard to global and economic governance, they favour a multipolar world order in which the 
United Nations plays a central role, and support the aspirations of Brazil and India to become 
permanent members of its Security Council. They also recognise the leadership of the G20 
and emphasise the need for substantial change in voting powers in the IMF and World Bank 
in favour of the emerging and developing economies. In any event, leaving aside these matters 
of governance, below is a general review of the positions of the BRICs and the emerging 
economies on some of the key issues for the global economy: the stability of the international 
monetary system, the Doha trade negotiations and the fi ght against climate change.
The large emerging 
economies vis-à-vis 
certain global challenges
World GDP in 
PPPs. 2010
World GDP in $. 
2010 Current IMF
IMF yet to be 
rati?ed (b) Current WB
WB yet to be 
rati?ed (c)
China 13,3 9,3 3,7 6,1 2,8 4,4
India 5,3 2,3 1,9 2,6 2,8 2,9
Russia 3,0 2,4 2,7 2,6 2,8 2,8
Brazil 2,9 3,3 1,4 2,2 2,1 2,2
BRICs 24,5 17,2 9,7 13,5 10,5 12,3
EMERGING & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 47,1 33,5 38,0 41,3 40,9 44,6
United States 20,2 23,6 16,7 16,5 16,4 15,9
G7 40,1 51,2 44,4 41,2 42,9 39,3
Spain 1,9 2,2 1,4 1,9 1,7 1,9
ADVANCED COUNTRIES (a) 52,9 66,5 62,0 58,7 59,2 55,4
EU countries 20,6 26,0 32,0 29,4 28,5 26,3
SHARE OF WORLD GDP AND VOTING POWER (%) TABLE 3
SOURCES: WEO, IMF and World Bank. 
a. Classi?cation of advanced, emerging and developing countries used by the IMF in the WEO, which considers South Korea and Singapore 
to be advanced countries. The whole of this table is consistent with that classi?cation, which differs from that used o??cially by the World Bank 
and the IMF when these institutions calculate vote reallocations by country group. The data included here are for illustrative purposes only. 
b. The agreements reached in April 2008 and November 2010 have yet to be rati?ed by countries representing at least 85% of total votes. 
c. The October 2008 and April 2010 agreements have yet to be rati?ed by countries representing at least 85% of total votes. 
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The BRIC countries favour a more stable, predictable and diversifi ed international monetary 
system designed to maintain the relative stability of the major reserve currencies. The Chinese 
authorities have even undertaken initiatives in this respect [Zhou Xiaochuan (2009)], proposing 
a system in which the international reserve currency is supranational. However, it should be 
noted that some of their policies (such as excessive accumulation of reserves or exchange-
rate rigidity, in some cases) do not contribute to the stability of the system.
The changes in the international monetary system in the past decade have been marked by a 
sharp rise in the accumulation of foreign reserves (to a level equivalent to 14% of world GDP) 
and by their growing concentration in the emerging countries (particularly China and the BRICs), 
as noted in Section 2. So far most of these reserves are denominated in dollars, but the pos-
sibility of sharp adjustments in their level or in the mix of assets and currencies in such a large 
volume of reserves is invested means that the countries with large reserves have a notable abil-
ity to affect international fi nancial stability. An example is the recent controversy over the ten-
dency for Chinese purchases of yen-denominated assets to cause this currency to appreciate. 
In this respect, international reserve management must be exercised prudently and the mitiga-
tion of the factors behind the excessive growth of world reserves should be a shared responsi-
bility of the international community, including the main reserve-accumulating countries.
The escalation of reserve accumulation among the emerging countries has been prompted by 
the benefi ts, whether actual or perceived, of the above-mentioned accumulation, which, in 
part, drive them to not fall behind their peers. For that reason, it is essential to prevent reserve 
accumulation from becoming an indicator of the vulnerability and external solvency of coun-
tries. Furthermore, the accumulating countries themselves should avoid manipulating ex-
change rates to gain competitiveness. Finally, for the BRICs to take an international economic 
leadership role, their currencies would have to move towards full convertibility, which neces-
sarily requires greater openness of the capital account. Here Brazil and Russia are more ad-
vanced than the other two BRICs. In the case of China, which because of its size is more 
likely to spawn an international reserve currency, more audacious steps will be needed than 
those taken so far in this respect, and they will have to be directed to refocusing its develop-
ment model on the domestic market and to raising exchange-rate fl exibility.
The emerging countries, particularly the BRICs, have signifi cantly liberalised their trade in the 
last two decades and, accordingly, its volume has grown considerably. The liberalisation has 
been based mainly on tariff reductions. These cuts have not been made linearly, but rather have 
fl uctuated over time depending on the country involved, and even moved backwards at certain 
moments. Currently China is the country with the most open tariff regime of the four BRICs [it 
is ranked 63rd out of 125 in the 2007 MFN Tariff Restrictiveness Index (TTRI)]5 and, at the 
other extreme, India, ranked 102nd, is the most protectionist country of the four, while Russia 
is ranked 70th and Brazil 93rd. Therefore, despite the sharp tariff reductions of the last 20 
years, there is still much room for trade liberalisation in the four countries. The BRICs joined the 
WTO fairly recently: India and Brazil have been members since 1995 and China since 2001, 
while Russia, which began membership negotiations in 1993, concluded bilateral conversa-
tions with the United States in October 2010, and foreseeably its admission, supported by the 
other BRICs in their communiques, will be formalised in the next few months.
The global prospects of trade liberalisation are largely based on the consummation of the 
Doha Round, also known as the “development round”, which began in 2001 and should have 
Stability of the 
international monetary 
system
International trade
5.  The Most Favoured Nation Trade Tariff Restrictiveness Index (MFN TTRI) summarises the trade restraints exercised by 
the MFN trade structure of the country. It is calculated by the World Bank Development Economics Research Group.
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fi nished in 2004. The positions in play allow a fi rst broad distinction to be drawn between 
developed countries and emerging countries. The latter insist that the developed countries 
practically remove subsidies on agricultural production and on the export of agricultural prod-
ucts. By contrast, the developed countries are asking for greater tariff reductions for indus-
trial products in the emerging countries, particularly China, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina 
and India, and greater liberalisation in trade in services. From the outset of the negotiations, 
both India and Brazil have played a notably active role and more recently they have been 
joined by China.
The growing role of the BRICs has been refl ected particularly in agricultural negotiations, which 
are of great importance for China, India and Brazil, and for the developing countries as a whole. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note that, although these three countries have partly opposing 
interests, they have managed to reach common positions since 2003, within the G20 group of 
countries in the negotiations of the Round, composed solely of emerging countries. In indus-
trial products, the positions of Brazil and India a more defensive and seek to limit the openness 
of their markets. For its part, China, as a major exporter, defends a substantial tariff reduction, 
although it considers that it already made signifi cant commitments when it joined the WTO, 
and is more active in negotiations on rules, particularly against dumping, since it is often sub-
jected to this practice. Finally, as regards access to services markets, India holds more open 
positions in specifi c cases, such as the provision of information technology services, whereas 
China opts for gradual liberalisation and Brazil strongly resists signifi cant liberalisation in sec-
tors considered strategic (education, health, insurance and fi nancial services).
Outside the strict Doha environment, it will also be desirable for the BRICs (and particularly 
China) to adapt their export credit practices to international standards, since none of them has 
committed itself to the “OECD consensus” which sets the common rules on the fi nancing of 
exports with offi cial support.
In short, there is room for a more ambitious contribution from the BRICs to help bring the Doha 
Round to a successful conclusion. In particular, as part of the necessary quid pro quo of the 
negotiations, greater commitments would be required from them on access to the market for 
non-agricultural products and on services.
Given the growing weight of the emerging and developing countries in greenhouse gas emis-
sions, they will have to adopt new measures also in this area and to participate more actively 
in the global fi ght against climate change.
Their stance on this issue highlights the principles of equality and differing responsibilities. Their 
main arguments are: that regard should be had not only to present and future emissions, but 
also to those in the past; that the limitation of their CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions 
would restrict their possibilities of economic growth and development; and that their emissions 
per capita are lower than those of the developed countries, especially the United States. Accord-
ing to these arguments, the BRICs did not commit themselves to limit emissions under the 
Kyoto Protocol, with the exception of Russia. Its case was special, since, given the sharp fall in 
its emissions in the nineties, it could accept a binding commitment to ensure that its emissions 
would not exceed those of 1990, which is actually an unambitious commitment.
The Copenhagen Accord of December 2009 failed to live up to expectations, following the 
intense preparatory work led by the European countries. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, it is not an 
international agreement in the United Nations framework and the targets announced by the 
countries are not binding. Thus, although the result of the recent Cancun Summit was encour-
Combating climate 
change
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aging, the legal framework which will govern the fi ght against climate change after 2012 has 
yet to be determined. The positive results of Copenhagen include a signifi cant expansion of 
the number of countries which have assumed voluntary quantitative targets to be met in 2020, 
such as the United States, the BRICs (see Table 4) and many other emerging countries. China 
and India, maintaining their position of not accepting quantitative limitations on emissions, has 
specifi ed their targets in terms of a reduction in their GDP emission intensity; Brazil has an-
nounced, among other actions, the reduction of deforestation in the Amazon Basin; and Rus-
sia will seek to reduce its total emissions with respect to those of 1990. However, although the 
objectives announced by many countries are signifi cant and represent a step forward in the 
global solution, especially if the upper range of the announced bands is reached, additional 
measures will be required by both the developed and the emerging and developing countries. 
These additional measures will include the reduction of solid fuel subsidies, commonplace in 
the developing economies, and the widespread application of the system of emission rights 
trading.
The emerging economies, and, among them, China and the other three countries of the BRIC 
group, have, with the turn of the century, become increasingly important actors in the global 
economy, raising their share of world GDP and trade, and of fi nancial fl ows of all types, be they 
direct investment, portfolio investment or debt security issues. Their resilience to the crisis, in 
contrast to the strong impact suffered by the developed economies (where the effects will 
limit growth in the coming years), will hasten the consolidation of the increasingly important 
positions of the emerging countries in the global economy. Indeed, on recent estimates, the 
buoyancy of their activity will make them the powerhouses of world growth over the next fi ve 
years. The achievement of an ongoing growth rate which is high but also more stable, along 
with slower population growth, has, moreover, brought sharp rises in income per capita and 
an acceleration of the process of convergence with the advanced economies.
These signifi cant changes in the governance of the international economic institutions in the 
last two years refl ect the growing weight of the BRICs and other emerging countries in the 
world economy, a process which has accelerated drastically with the international fi nancial 
crisis, and respond to the need to take them into account in designing the exit from the crisis. 
Moreover, the BRICs (the systemically most important emerging countries) have forged a cer-
tain coalition amongst themselves to defend common interests, and have achieved unques-
tionable progress in the most important one, namely increased participation in the institutions 
of international governance so as to better refl ect their economic weight. These changes are 
more complicated to make in the institutions where country representation is a zero sum 
Conclusions
KYOTO PROTOCOL (a) COPENHAGEN ACCORD (b)
China -40% to -45% in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP with respect to 2005
India -20% to -25% in carbon emission intensity with respect to 2005
Russia -15% to -25%
Brazil -35% to -39% with respect to emissions expected in 2020
USA -17% with respect to 2005
EU -20% to -30%
-25%Japan
KYOTO EMISSION REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AND COPENHAGEN TARGETS. MAJOR EMITTERS TABLE 4 
SOURCE: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
a. GHG emission levels in the 2008-2012 commitment period with respect to 1990. 
b. 2020 levels with respect to 1990, except where indicated otherwise. 
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game, such as the IMF and the World Bank, but even in these cases they have made substan-
tial progress. However, the interests of these countries do not extend with the same intensity 
to other international fi elds and institutions where their active participation would also be desir-
able and benefi cial. In particular, an increased contribution to development aid channelled 
through the multilateral fi nancial institutions, the express assumption of the costs and disci-
pline associated with the Paris club, and the acceptance and internal application of the OECD 
general framework for best policy practices, would help to lend greater legitimacy and sub-
stance to the BRICs’ desire to increase their participation in world governance.
Similarly, a movement of these countries towards positions which more accurately refl ect glo-
bal interests in key matters for the international economy, such as the accumulation of interna-
tional reserves, the Doha Round and the fi ght against climate change, would be highly benefi -
cial, particularly at the present time, when the world economy needs collective agreements 
which can raise confi dence in the measure needed to consolidate the recovery. More gener-
ally, it can be expected that the large emerging economies will involve themselves in world 
government in a constructive way, befi tting the responsibility and institutional maturity which 
should accompany their greater weight in the global economy. This attitude, which is already 
becoming evident in some areas, can only result in a better situation for all.
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